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This paper investígatea the connection between apecialization and money in
a search general equilibrium model with indiviaible commodities. It is shown
how individuals with different comparative advantages sort themselves out be-
tween autarkic and mazket or specialized types. If the economy is not "frag-
mented" or "dual", we show that even a small sized monetary system, mea-
sured by the supply of cash balances per capita, will strictly enlarge marketa
and enhance the economy-wide specialization in comparison with a pure barter
regime. Otherwise, the size of the monetary system has to exceed a critical
level in order to foster markets and specialization, and there may be cases in
which monetary exchange cannot push specialization any further, despite the
fact that money is alwaya Pareto-improving.
Money improves upon bazter because it overcomes incentive problems in
the exchange process by imposing a lesa stringent form of quid pro quo. In
particular, we construct a model which allowa for gift-giving "exchanges" to
appraise the welfare coat of barter.
Finally, we show that our construction can rationalize reduced form models
of money in the utility function by lifting the atandazd assumption in search
equilibrium that people can accumulate up to one object, whether goods or
currency.
JE:L classification numbers: E40, D50, 016.
~The current vereion was prepared while at CentER to which I thank for its hoepitality. The
original vereion of this reeearch was aupported by a grant from the National Science Foundation.
~1 am indebted to Professor Jaeeph Oatroy for suggesting the topic and guidance throughout thia
research. Also, I acknowledge the membere of my diasertation committee Bryan Ellickaon, David
Levine, John McCall, Sushil Bikchandani, and ]ohn Mamer for valuable comments arid criticiams.
Of courae, the usual disclaimer applies.1
1 Introduction
This paper explores the relationahip between the degree of apecialization and
money. It is conventional wisdom that in a world with trading frictions, the
introduction of money enlarges marketa and improvea the ef6ciency of the ex-
change proceas. But the consequences of monetary exchange are not limited
to trade. Adam Smith's often-cited claim that "apecialization and division
of labor are limited by the extent of the market" suggesta that gaina in pro-
ductivity, a prímary source of economic growth, are another channel through
which money can be welfare-improving. Money along with other institutions
such as capital marketa, financial intermediation, and technologies of com-
mm~ication and transportation is a determinant of the extent of the market.
Hahn [1982) digressed on the general relevance of this theme.
There ia a substantial body of work dealing with the connection between
real output and monetary and financial factora. To begin with, we have the
stream of papers, pioneered by Tobin (1965], diacussing "Money and Growthn
in highly aggregative modela of money in the utility or production function:
Sidrauski [1967], Levhari and Patinkin [1968], Brock (1975] and Calvo (1978].
Here, money is viewed as a atore of value, and ita influence on growth hingea
on portfolio effects.
A different branch of the literature, leas formal but not leas inaightful,
is associated with the books by McKinnon [1973] and Shaw [1973]. They
highlight the importance of financial deepening in fostering economic de-
velopment, and the role of financial repression in "fragmentedn or "dual"
economies.
Attempts at modeling financial intermediariea, auch as banks, and their
rulc in the growth of rcxl output are a more reccut and far from fiuiahed
business. l~or instance, Townsend [1983) and Bencivenga and Stnith [1991]
represent efforts in such adirection. A related work iucludes King and Plosser
[1986] tackling the problem of the selection of assets to serve as a medium
of exchange, and Economidea and Siow [1988] delving into the formation of2
markets and liquidity.
The point of departure of this research is Kiyotaki-Wright [1991] multi-
commodity version of Diamond [1982, 1984] search general equilibrium mod-
els. They analyze the transaction tole of money in an environment with
a continuum of differentiated commodities, concentrating on the existence,
characterization and robustness of monetary equilibria3 More broadly, this
research follows a tradition of bilateral trading models: Ostroy (1973], Ostroy-
Starr [1974], Harris [1979], Jones [1976], Townsend [1980], Oh [1989].
Search general equilibrium models have two building blocks: a production
sector and a trading sector. As for the former sector, and unlike Kiyotaki-
Wright [1991], agents in our model choose both the production rate and the
type oJ commodity to be produced according to a schedule of comparative
advantages. In order to model the trading sector, we draw heavily from Kiy-
otaki and Wright's model. In particular, we take their specification of the
matching technology and transaction costs. However, differences in inven-
tory holding assumptions lead to different welfare implications: in our setup,
monetary ezchange is always Pareto superior to óarter.
We carry out of the investigation by modeling an economy with agents oí
different productivity.4 A bit of semantics is in order, for the venerable ideas
of specialization and division of labor are not free from ambiguity. In the pa-
per we have to distinguish individual specialization from the economy-widc
specialization. At an individual level, it is an "all-or-nothing" phenomenon:
an agent specializes if he produces with the prospect of a sale; otherwise, he
produces for self-consumption. The first individual will be a"market type"
and the second one an "autarkic typer. At an economy-wide level, specializa-
tion is a matter of degree: thefraction of the population choosing to produce
[or the market will be our measure of the economy-wide specialization, and
3After thia paper was written, the author became aware oC Kiyotaki-Wright [1990J by
a personal communication from Randall Wright. They developed an specialization modef
in the same apirit of Section 8 of Siandra (1990].
,For models with homogeneous types see Kiyotaki-Wright [1990] and Siandra [1990].3
the aim of the paper is to pin down how people sort out themselves in these
two types.
The basic result oí the paper is the atatement of a sufficient condition
for monetary exchange to enhance the economy-wide specialization, which
revolves around the concept "fragmented" or "dualn economy. In McKinnon
[1973]'s words:
The economy is "fragmented" in the sense that firms and house-
holds are so isolated that thcy face different effectivc pricew for
land, labor, capital, and produced commodities and do not have
access to the same technologies.
He further elaborates:
Modern fragmentation, therefore, has been largely the result of
government policy and goes beyond the old distinction between
the export enclave and the traditional subsistence sector. One
manifestation is the often-noted existence of small household en-
terprises and large corporate firms -all producing similar prod-
ucts with different factor proportions and very different levels of
technological efficiency.
We will represent economic "fragmentation" by discontinuities or "breaks"
in the economy-wide schedule of comparative advantages.
In a weak sense, the introduction of (fiat) money never decreases the
specialization of the economy. But specialization increases strictly if the
economy is not jragmented. Taking the supply of cash balances per capita as
a measure of the degree of development of the monetary system, our result
meana that even a small sized monetary system, will enlarge markets and
enhance specialization. If the economy is fragmented, the efíect of money
on specialization will depend on the size of the monetary system and the
extent of the "fragmentationr. Now the size of the monetary system may
have to exceed a critical level for specialization to increase. If the extent of4
the fragmentation is very large, it may happen that even an nptitnally sizorl
monetary system cannot expand markets and specialization any further, even
though monetary exchange is always Pareto-improving.
The foregoing suggests that, in a well integrated-economy, a gradual de-
velopment of the monetary syatem can do the job offurthering specialization,
otherwise the monetary system has to reach a minimum size to overcome the
"technological or developrnent trap".
The extent of the conclusions is not limited to the connection between
money and specialization. From a pure monetary theory point of view, we
construct a model allowing for gift-giving to appraise the welfare cost of
barter as an extreme form of quid pro quo, where barter is viewed as a
incentive-compatible constraint to overcome the problem of dishonesty in
the exchange process. Monetary exchange solves the same incentive problems
by imposing a softer constraint, for its quid pro quo is not longer based on
"double coincidence of wants". For this reason, and unlike Kiyotaki-Wright
(1988] and Diamond [1984], our monetary exchange is always Pareto superior
to barter. With different nuances, Ostroy [1973], Ostroy-Starr [1974], Lucas
[1980], Green [1987], Townsend [1987] and Aiyagari-Wallace [1991] also high-
light incentive problems in monetary theory.
We can always observe barter transactions in this model. However, barter
will be less frequent as the number of consumer types and commodities
gets larger. Casual empiricism gces with this remark: the most developed
economies display such a variety of commodities that there is little wonder
that people do not barter. This implies that Clower-constraints arise natu-
rally, i.e., eadogenously, when the commodity space is big enough.
As in other bilateral exchange models, we model money from fundamen-
tals, that is, specifying preferences, technology and information and time
atructure ftom scratch. Our environment enable us to propose search general
equilibrium models as a rationale for reduced form models with money in the
utility and production function. In Section 6 we allow for the accumulation
of more than one unit of fiat money so that we can study the accumulation5
and diatribution of cash balancea. The main property asaumed in those re-
duced form models are either decreasing marginal utility or productivity of
money. We are able to prove that our setup implies that property.a
The structure of the paper is as followa: Section 2 deacribes the envi-
ronment of the main model, Sectiona 3 and 5 analyze barter and a simple
monetary economy, Section 4 studiea the welfare costs of barter, Section 6 in-
troduces a generalized monetary model allowing agents to accumulate higher
ca.9h balances, Section 7 gathers all the proofa and some supporting lemmae,
and finally an Appendix includes several formulae and algebraic derivations.
2 The environment
The model economy has a finite number of indivisible commodities M~ 3.
In addition there is a continuum of infinitely-lived agenta with a normal-
ized mass of one. La.9tly, thc model is fratned in contiuuous timcs and the
environment is assumed to be stationary.
Thcrc arc M consumcr types. An agent of type i derives an instantanr~ous
and conatant utility u 1 0 from the consumption of commodity i, and zero
otherwise. For sharper results, we will keep the number u invariant across
types.
As for the production side, every individual can choose to produce either
commodity i for aelf-consumption or commodity j~ i for trade, with instan-
taneous efforts per unit e; ~ 0 and e~ ~ 0 respectively. The relative costs of
producing commodities í and j, ry(Y) - e;~e„ increases in an agent charac-
teristic or production type Y E[0,1], where the function ry is assumed to be
independent of the pair of goods i and j. In other words, the higher Y, the
bAlong thia line, we mention that in another eetup Feenatra [1986] ehowe that money
in the utility function can be derived from aome traneaction coate models. Aowever, botó
are reduced form modele and there ie not derivation from a more fundamental eetting.
BHere we [ollow the search general equilibrium literature which overwhelmingly casts
ite modele in continuous time; óowever that is not easential.6
lower his or her comparative advantage of production for self-consumption.
We can think of Y's as labels of specific factors diattibuted all over the pop-
ulation ot producers. A convenient normalization ia to set e~ as a constant
independent of Y and j, letting e;(Y) be a function of Y.
We impose monotonicity on y, but not continuity. Indeed, discontinuities
will be a way of representing a"fragmentedT economy, and a great deal of
insight can be obtained from them. Metaphorically speaking, a jump in
ry can have at least two interpretations: a) neighboring production sectors
having different degrees of technological development, or b) the result of
institutional, physical or technological barriers to factor mobility, or factor
market policy induced distortions.
An agent's characteristicB are summarized by the triple (i,j, Y). Let us
denote by SC the space of characteristics:
SC -{(i, j, Y) : j, i- 1, 2, . .., M; Y E [0,1]}.
We shall assume that SC. induces a uniform distribution on the population.
An immediate implication of this is that consumption types are independent
of production types. For our purposes, Y wil! be the relevant type jor this
model.
Each individual has to make a decision as to whether to produce for self-
consumption (i) or for the market (j). Generally speaking, that decision will
be contingent on the type Y. Thus, the economy will have "autarkicn types
choosing i and "market" types settling for j. The jraction of market typcs
in the population will tell us the eztenl to which the economy is specialized.
The aim of this paper is to pin down that distribution.
We will resort to the often-used island metaphor to describe the economy.
In order to produce, agents must spend time and effort on tlie "production
island" (PI). In addition, those producing for sale must search for trading
partners and trade on the "trading island" (TI).
The production process is extremely simple. Suppose that an agent enters
the PI with no inventory of commodities at time to. From then he will wait7
a random períod t so that he can apply effort e;(Y) or e~ to produce one
unit of either commodity at time to f t. After production, commodities
are immediately available either for aelf-consumption or sale. The level of
commodity inventory is cither 0 or 1. The random waiting period t follows
an exponential distribution with parameter a. In case of production for
self-consumption, the individual will consume it right away and restart the
procesa without leaving the PI. If the output is channeled to the market, he
will go the TI and remain there until he sells it. After that, he goea back to
the PI to replenish his depleted inventory.
Therefore, an autarkic type Y will produce and consume at random times
to, tt, tz, ... and obtain an instantaneous utility of u- e;(Y). Since the wait-
ing times follow an exponential distribution with parameter o, the random
number of pointa t~ in fixed time interval of length h follows a Poisson process
with parameter a.
To give a similar description for a market type we have to provide more
detaiis about trading. Trade is carried out in a decentralized fashion through
bilateral deals. Thus, when we speak of "markets", we mean a flow of bilat-
eral transactions. When trading, agenta are assumed to interact in a non-
cooperative fashion in an environment in which they are paired at random.
The details of the strategic interaction depend upon the trading regimes,
either barter or monetary, and are spelled out later on.
The costs oftrade are pattiallycosts of search. The latter is costly because
it is tim~-conauminq and individuals discount the future. Moreover, following
Kiyotaki and WrighL, it is assumed that traders incur a lump aum disutility
cost E whenever they accept a good in exchange. That is, E is a transaction
cost which discourages individuals from accepting commodities for indirect
trading. If there were no transaction costa (E - 0), every commodity could
be used as a means of exchange and therefore the model would not be useful
for analyzing monetary exchange.
The paper aticks to the following search story: after producing one unit
of commodity j, the typical trader holda it as inventory until he meets apartner with whom he can close a transaction. Meanwhile, he engages in
a time-consuming search ior trading opportunities, which arrive at random.
In order to make this precise, we draw from Kiyotaki-Wright's specification
of Diamond's matching technology. In this setup, potential trading partners
arrive according to a simple Poisson process with pazameter B(N,), where
N, is the fraction of market types engaged in search for a match at a point
of time, that is, the ones in the TI at time t. The function B is given by:
B(N,) Q if N, ~ 0
- 0 otherwise
where ~i ~ 0. After a sale or barter transaction, the trader goes back to the
PI to replenish his inventory.~
For illustration purposes, we end this section with the computation oí
the expected discounted utility conditional on type Y in an economy without
trading possibilities. Autarky is the benchmark for the analysis of this paper.
Every type can guarantee the autarkic payoff by producing and consuming
his or her commodity i.
It will be useful to state an assumption to ensure that the expected dis-
counted utility of autarky is set at a positive level:
Assumption 1 The instantaneous utility of producing and consuming a com-
modity in his or her consumption set is strictly positive. More formally, for
al( types Y : u- e;(Y) 1 0. Moreover, u 1 e~.
The lifetime expected discounted utility under autarky for type Y will be
denoted by Va(Y). Keeping in the background our description of the timing
rIn the searcó literature, the functional dependence between B and N, is usually re-
ferred to as "aearch externality". The apecification given virtually ignorea the Iatter. Kiy-
otaki and Wrightjustify the assumption saying that it "...reducea but doea not eliminate
the multiplicity of equilibria that can arise with auch externalitiea." On more substantive
grounda, the aeeumption chosen is a sort of "constant returns to people". In any cave,
sttonger search externalities are lilcely to reinforce our reaulta.9
under autarky, we will write a recuraive equation which fits it. Consider
the time axia divided in a sequence of diacrete intervals of length h. The
individual has the choice of producing one unit of commodity i or j in a
period of length h with a probability ah:
V,(Y) - e-'k(ah max{u - e;(Y) f V,(Y), V,(Y) - e~} f
(1 - ah)V,(Y)] f o(h)
where r ia Lhe discount rate and o(h) is a reaidual term which collects the
e(Cects on utility of more than one unit consumed and produced in a period
of length h, which happens with a amall probability. Rearranging terms and
taking limits when h-. 0, we get the continuoua time veraion:
rV,(Y) - a max{u - e;(Y), -e~}.
Considering V,(Y) as an asset, we can interpret the equation in terms of
asset valuation: the fiow oí utility from holding the asset has to be equal to
the expected value of holding the option of producing one commodity, i or
j. Of course, under our assumptions, the equation collapses to:
rV,(Y) - a(u - e;(Y)).
3 Trading arrangements: The barter case
Now we modify the environment to include barter trading possibilities. This
opens the gates to specialization since individuals can produce for self-consumption
or for the market. In either case,the timing of the production activities is
determined by the previously defined exogenous Poisson rate a.
A barter Lransaction requires that the trader makea a deal with another
who wants what he has and has what he wants. Thia condition ia the well-
known udouble coincidence of wants".lo
An agent on the PI (TI) ia said to be in state "pn ("t~). Let VD(Y) and
Vi(Y) be the expected discounted utilities for type Y under those states.
These utilities, viewed as the values oí two different assets, must satisfy a
system of two recursive or Bellman's equations, one of which reflects the
choices open on the PI and the other on the TI.
Let us take up the production choice. With a flow probability a, the
producer faces the option of producing i for self-consumption, which yields
u-e;(Y), or producing j for sale, in which case he will get the "capital gain"
ti(Y) - Vp(Y) net of effort e~. In terms of asset valuation, the flow utility ot
being in state p has to equate the expected value of the option:
rVp(Y) -~ max{u - e;(Y), V(Y) - Vp(Y) - e~ }.
On these grounds we can state an important definition:
Definition 1 The set of market types under barter tis given by:
MTb-{Y:u-e;(Y)CV(Y)-V~(Y)-e~}.
The set of autarkic types is the complement of MT6 in ~0,1f.
Notice that, if the environment makes trading difficult, e.g., the rate of
arrival of trading partners Q is very small, MT6 can be empty. On the other
hand, MT6 can be the whole economy should trade be very easy (large ~?). Iu
general we shall focus on the intermediate outcomes ín which MT6 is proper
subset of the interval [0,1]. Since the effort to produce the commodity j is
not contingent on Y, the values VP(Y) and Vi(Y) are constant for all market
types Y(Y E MT6). Thus we will speak of Vp and V: when we refer to
market types.
Turning our attention to trading activities, we will determinethe expected
discounted value of being a trader under barter V(}'). We defined Q as
the exogenous rate of arrival of trading opportunities. However, meeting a
partner does not mean that a trade will take place. To close a deal under11
barter requires that the other party accept what he haa. Since people commit
themaelves to production choices and search before knowing the tastes of the
future potential partners, they need to hold aome beliefa about the other
partner's willingness to trade. We define B as the belief about the probability
that his match will accept in exchange the commodity held in inventory. In
game theoretic terminology, B's are the "Bayesian" beliefa of this game of
incomplete iníormation.
Aa for the trading atate t, the trader faces the option of accepting or not
a commodity in exchange whenever there is a double coincidence of wants,
which happens with a flow probability B(N,)B(1~M). Thus, the flow utility
of being in state t has to be equal to the expected value of the option:
rV(Y) - B(N,)B(I~M) max{0, u, f Vo(Y) - Vi(Y)},
where u, - u- c. Since B was defined as the trader's belief about the prob-
ability that his trading partner will accept hia inventory, and people accept
commodities with a probability 1~M, consistency of beliefs with equilibrium
behavior requires B - 1~M.
We will concentrate on equilibria with a positive fraction of searchers in
the TI, Lhat is, N, ~ 0. Hence from now on we set B(N,) - Q.e In Section
7 we show that, for any market type Y, the expected discounted utility from
trading V~(Y) is strictly positive, provided that the fraction of searchera out
o[ MT6, N„ is also strictly positive (Lemma 1). Therefore, the value of being
a trader can be finally written as
rV(Y) -(QIM~)(u~ i- Vr(Y) - Ve(Y)).
After setting up the workinga of the barter regime, we can determine how
individuals are aorted out between market (apecialized) and sutarkic types.
eNotice that there is alwaye a trivial equilibrium with N, - 0. Hence, B(0) - 0 and
the expected diecounted utility ot the trading etate, V,(Y), is aleo 0 for all typee Y. Ae a
conxnqucuce, evrryhody will be in autarky.12
The size of the set MT6 tells us the extent of the market and the degree oJ
specialization oJ the economy. The Lebesgue measure }~(MT6) is a measure
of the size of this set. Obviously,
0 ~ ~(MT6) C 1.
The monotonicity of effort functions in Y allows us to write the extent of the
market and the degree of specialization as:
~(MT6) - 1 - inf(MTb),
where inf(MTb) is the borderline between the autarkic and the market types,
provided that MT6 is nonempty. Otherwise p(0) - 0 and the "marginal" or
"borderlinen type is one.
Figure 1 illustrates the economy-wide degree ofspecialization under barter.
The autarkic payoffconditional on the type Y is the declining curve u-e;(Y),
the utility of producing for sale is the horizontal line Sy - V- Vp - e~.
Since these curves represent continuous functions, the borderline type Y' -
inf(MTs) is at the intersection of both.s Market (specialized) typa5 are to
the right of Y', and the autarkic ones make up the remaining left side. Even
though the ca.ge of incompleteeconomy-wide specialization, as depicted in the
diagram, is more likely, the extreme instances Y' - 0 or 1 are also meaning-
ful.
In Appendix A we present closed form solutions for Vp and tí in terms
of the parameters of the model. An straightforward inspection reveals that
the degree of specialization decreases with the interest rate r, the number
of commodities M, and the ratio a~Q. Since production for sale will entail
a longet waiting period to consume, it is logical that a higher discount rate
will imply a lower reward to specialization. So in economies lesa endowed
with capital, specialization will be less developed. As to the number of
commodities M, a higher M will push down the probability of a double
aContinuity ia not necessary for the analyeis.Figure 1: Economy-wide degree of apecialization under barter.
coincidence oí wants, making exchange more difficult. Lastly, the higher the
ratio a~~, the lower the relative time cost of autarky.
4 The welfare cost of barter: A gift-giving
arrangement
With the name of "gift-giving" we mean a first-best allocation subject to the
matching technology but not to quid pro quo. The purpose of the section
is to bring out the issue of incentives in the exchange process since we can
think of quid pro quo as a particular type of incentive compatible constraint.
It is clear that barter is an extreme way of imposing quid pro quo. In a
world of honest people, enforcement of budget conatraints in trading through
exchange of commodities of equal value would not be necessary. In this
section we model an environment in which people are willingto makebilateral
as well as unilateral transfers of commodities. In other words, we allow for
barter, gift-taking and gift-giving. This will be our benchmark to appraise
the cost of barter, which ia basically the coat of quid pro quo as an incentive-14
compatible constraint.
This model parallels the barter one as much as possible. In particular,
individuals have the choice of producing either for self-consumption or for
exchange and gift-giving. As before, the decision will be contingent on the
type Y. Those producing for self-conaumption will be called autarkic types.
It would be a terminological abuse to call market types those choosing to
produce for exchange and gift-giving; so we call them outward types.
Autarkic types will remain on the PI for good, and outward types will
switch between the PI (state P) and the TI (state T). Let VP{Y) and VT(Y)
be the expected discounted life-time utilities corresponding to the mentioned
states. Whenever an agent depletes his inventory by exchange or gift-giving,
he must replenish by production. The Bellman equation of the production
state is the same as before:
rVP(Y) - a max{u - e;(Y), VT(Y) - Vp(Y) - e~}.
Agents sort out themselves by solving this equation. As a result, we have
the following definition:
Definition 2 The set of outward types is
OT -{Y : u- e;(Y) c VT(Y) - VP(Y) - e~},
and the degree oj specialization is given 6y the Lebesgue measure oj OT,
p(OT).
As mentioned in our discussion of barter, the values VP(Y) and VT(Y)
are constant on the set oí outward types OT.
The meaning of "tradern is trickier here. A trader, in this context, holds
an inventory of commodity j that he surrenders to his partner should the
latter so desire. Since we still keep the lump-sum disutility cost c, traders
request commodity i. When requesting, traders can be gift-takers should the
commodity they possess not be in the partner's consumption type.is
The equation for the state T doee not involve any maximization. It is only
a recursive relation to compute VT(Y). However, VT(Y) can be interpreted as
either the result oï the choice of honest people, or the outcome of a command
economy in which the planner has perfect and complete information. To apell
out the details more fully we give the equation in discrete time:
VT(Y) - e-'"{(1 -~h((1 f 2(M - 1))IM'))VT(Y) f
t?h(M - 1)M-'Vp(Y) f~hM-'(u~ f Vp(Y)) t
(ih(M - 1)M-~(u~ f VT(Y))} f o(h).
The first term between curly brackets reflects the event of either no match
or no coincidence of wants, the second one, gift-giving, the third one, barter
and the last one, gift-taking. The continuous time version is given by
rVT(Y) -(QIM)(u~ f Vp(Y) - vT(Y)).
The propositions which follow ate the main conclusions of this section:
Proposition 1 The gift-givéng arrangement is ez ante Pareto superior to




Notice that the larger the number of consumption types M, the higher
the welfare losses of barter.
Proposition 2 The gift-giving arrangement is statewise Pareto superior to
barter:
VT(Y) ~ Vi(Y) and Vp(Y) ~ Vn(Y) jor all Y E OT,
and equality jor the remaining types.Is
Proposition 3 The degree of specialization under the gift-giving arrange-
ment is higher than under óarter, provided that the effort e;(Y) is continuous
in Y. Furthermore, if the set of outward typea is non-empty, the degree of
specialization under gift-giving can be written as
p(OT) - 1 - inf(OT).
5 Trading arrangements: The fiat money case
The monetary economy of this section is a step forward to a softer quid pro
quo than that imposed by barter, for single coincidence of wants are enough
to close transactions. Nevertheless, monetary exchange is Pareto inferior to
the arrangement described in the preceding section.
Under this trading regime, individuals have the possibility of holding one
unit of a"worthless" object which will play the role of inedium of exchange.
In this context, "worthless" means that it has neither consumpt.ion nor pro-
duction value. Thus this section deals with "fiatr money. To put money and
commodities on the same footing, it is assumed that money bears the same
transaction cost e as any commodity. In other words, the model does not
give an "unfair" advantage to money over commodities.
In principle, any trader can hold either an inventory of one commodity
or the cornbination of a commodity and fiat money. We call these two states
"c" and "cmn respectively. Sometimes we will speak of these states as types
c and cm. People of these types are found on the TI.
A monetary transaction can only take place when agents in different states
meet. In this section, we do not allow for accumulation of more than one
unit of fiat money. As a consequence, there cannot be monetary transactions
when two people of type cm meet. Individuals in the same state can only
barter, while two agents in different states can barter or engage in monetary
exchange. We have to expand the notation a bit:17
~ w~: Proportion of people on the TI who are currently holding only an
iuventory of commoditiea, that is, in atate c.
~ O,y: '[Ype rn~'s bclief about type c's willingnesa to accept money in
exchange for a commodity.
A critical asaumption of the model ia that each individual ia forced to
replenish hia or her inventory of commodity j whenever it is given up in
exchange for money or for commodity i.'o As a result, every agent wifl
always carry an inventory oj commoditiea to the TL One way of thinking
about this is the fact that, in some sense, we always hold our endowment
of Iabor." Thus, when two individuals meet, there will always be room
for barter regardless of their trading state. When two agents in different
states meet, monetary exchange opens the gates to additional transactions
(purchases and sales). If we dropped the assumption, a trader in state cm
could end up as a pure money holder ahould he sell his commodity. And
between two pure money holdera neither barter nor any other traneaction
is possible." Hence, money expanda the typea of possible deals without
undermining barter transactiona.
In contrast with a recent strand of monetary theory literature, e.g. Lu-
cas [1980] and Diamond [1984], we do not impoae Clower-constraints to make
money valuable in the exchange process. Also, the way in which Kiyotaki
and Wright [1991] introduce money undi~rcuts some bartFr pOS9lbllltles, for
their model allow for pure money holders, and therefore they found casea in
which monetary exchange ia Pareto injeréor to barter. Some would queation
tlle possibility of having monetary along witt~ barter transactions. However,
historical evidence suggests that the presence of barter and monetaty ex-
'oIn a pure barter regime thia the natural aeaumption to make, for commoditite are the
only purchasing power and we allow for an atorage capacity ofone unit.
"I thank Prof. Oh for thia remarlc.
'~After this discuesion is clesr that the critical aaeumption ie built in the very definition
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Figure 2: State flow diagram.
change in the same economies is far from uncommon. 13 On the other hand,
an straightforward prediction of our model is that, as tiie nutnber of com-
modities M gets larger, barter transactions will become negligible. Thus the
aize of the commodity space is a simple account for Clower-constraints.
In addition to the trading states c and em, there will be two production
states: "pe" and "pmn. As before, individuals engage in production activities
on the PI. If, after a transaction, the agent holds neither a commodity nor
money, then he will switch to state pc, but, if he holds money, he will switch
to pm. In Figure 2 we represent a flow diagram among states for an agent
who engages in both barter and monetary transactions.
The optimal values of the expected discounted utilities Vyc(Y), Vym(Y),
V~(Y) and V~,,,(Y) satisfy the following system of Bellman equations in con-
tinuous time:
rVa(Y) - a max{u - e;(Y), V~(Y) - Vp~(Y) - e~ }
rVo,,,(Y) - amax{u - e;(Y),V~,,,(Y) - VP,,,(Y) - e~}
rV~(Y) - QM-2 max{0, u~ -}. V~(Y) - V~(Y)} ~
13See F. Braudel [1972, 1981, 1982] and C.Cipolla (1967].19
~(1 - w~)(M - 1)M'~ max{o,VD,„(Y) - V~(Y) - e}
rV~,,,(Y) -(iM-~ max{0, u, t V',,,(Y) - V~,,,(Y)} t
eiy~w~(M - 1)M'~ max{o, u~ t v~(Y) - vc„(Y)}.
Notice that the average fiow utilitiea of the trading atatea, rV~(Y) and
rV~,,,(Y), are the aum of the payoff from bartering and the payoff from a
monetary transaction (sales for atate c and purchasea for cm).
Definition S The set oj market types jor a monetary economyt~:
MTm -{Y : a(u - e;(Y)) G rVa(Y)}.
As was the case for the barter and gift-giving arrangements, the values
V~(Y), VDm(Y), V~(Y), and V~,,,(Y) are constant for Y E MTm, hence we
will eliminate the explicit dependence on Y whenever we speak of market
types.
MarkFt types will choose to accept money in exchange for their good if
v~,-v~-e~o.
Considering only symmetric pure atrategy equilibria, we define a monetary
equilibrium when all market typea are willing to engage in monetary trana-
actions. For the belief B,u to be consistent with equilibrium we need B,y - 1.
Of course, ií nobody is willing to accept money, 6- 0, we revert to a barter
equilibrium.
i~This definition leaves out the eet
{Y : a(u - e;(Y)) - rVi~(Y) G rVy,,,(Y)}.
In other worde, theee typea go to the market provided that, at the outeet, they were
endowed with money. Nevertheleae, they will be tranaient tradera, namely, until they
"hit" the etate pe, which ie an abeorbing barrier. Since we conaider eteady etatee only, we
can dieregard them.20
The money supply per capita m is re8ected in the fraction of individuals in
states pm and cm, and it can be readily expressed in terms of the proportion
w~ of commodity holders (c) on the TI:
m(w~) - a(1 - w~)[1 -~ w~(M - 1) f aM~]
p(w~ -~ (1 - w~)(1 .} w~(M - 1))) d- aM~ ~
The function m is decreasing and concave in w~ with m(0) - 1 and m(1) -
0. Because of our assumptions about inventory holdings, m- 0 or 1 are
actually barter solutions.
Defining "optimum quantity ofmoneyr as the valueof m which maximizes
the market type's expected value of the atates pc, pm, c and crn, we can state
the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Get fj with j- pc, pm, c, cm be the jraction of market types
in state j at a point in time.15 The maximum oj the active irader's ex-ante
payo.B
r(Ïnovyo ~ fvmVvm f foV~ ~ fcmVcm)
is achieved at w~ - 0.5. Mowever, that value is strictly less than the ex ante
~9:Ít-givíngn payoff
a~
~ f aM (u` - ei).
'That is, even when the money supply is optimally set, monetary exchange is
only an approximation to the first best of section 4.
In this economy everybody can guarantee the autarkic payoff. The the-
orem which follows makes a stronger statement: every active trader can
guarantee the barter payoff.
Proposition 5 Monetary ezchange is ex ante Paretosuperiorto óarter. The
market type's average utility is óounded óelow by the óarter payoff..
aQ(u~ - e~)
p f aM~ .
~SSee Appendix A.21
Propoaition 6 Monetary exchange ia atatewise Pareto superior to barter:
V(Y) C min{V~(Y),V~,,,(Y)} and Vp(Y) C min{V~(Y),Vp,,,(Y)}.
An easy corollary of this model is that the degree of apecialization and ex-
t~~nt of the market never dec reaaea when introducing money, namely, MT6 C
M7m. On intuitive grounds, an individual already in the market in a barter
economy looaes nothing if he participatea in an economy with money traders.
A suf6cient condition for an etrict increase in the degree of specialization
is a"mild" regularity condition on theeconomy-wideachedule of comparative
advantages:
Proposition 7 Let Ya e 1 6e the marginal type under óarter. Ij the effort
junction e;(Y) is continuous in a neighborhood ojYy, then monetary exchange
will increase the economy-wide apecialization.
In other words, if the economy is not fragmented, the introduction of
even a amall aized monetary syatem will bring an increase in the economy-
wide specialization and the extent of the market. Figure 3 illustrates the
last proposition. The returns from production for sale are S6 - V- Vy - e~
under barter and Sm - V~ - V~ - e~ under monetary exchange. The set of
specialized types under barter (monetary exchange) are the ones to the right
of Y6 (Ym).
Nowever we can get more insight from theobservation of the non-negligible
si~t of economii~ for which the proposition doiw uot hold. Figure 9 illuatratixi
such a case. The schedule of comparative advantages is discontinuous at
Y6 and monetary exchange does not bridge the "jumpn. If money aupply
was not optimally set, tliere may be some room to bridge the discontinuity
changing the money supply. Nevertheless, that would do the job if the gap
in comparative advantages is not too large.
The situation portrayed is highly reminiscent of the dual structure of
many LDC's, namely, a modernized enc(ave, often related to foreign trade22
i i
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Figure 4: B) Specialization under barter and monetary exchange.23
and highly monetized, along with a aubetantial "subaistence" or ~traditional"
sector. Jumps in the comparative advantages schedule are an stylized repre-
sentation of that "duality". In such a case, a further institutional develop-
ment of the monetary syst,eFn may or msy not make a difference in the extent
of the market and specialization depending on the size of the prevalent ~dis-
tortions" in the relative costs of the economy resources.
6 A generalized monetary i~odel
All search equilibrium models based on indivisible commodities and indivis-
ible money impose a very stringent restriction on inventory holdings: agents
can accumulate up to one object, whether goods or currency. Here we discuas
briefly an extension of the monetary model which allows for accumulation of
more than one unit of fiat money.
Since all the preceding resulta carry over to this extension, we want to
concentrate on the construction and derivation of the indirect utility function
of real cash balances so as to test the consistency of constructiona such as
money in the utility function. In particular we show that the indirect utility
function o[ money exhibits diminishing marginal returne. 1'his is interesting
because there is nothing suggesting concavity from the instantaneous utility
and effort functions.
To be concrete, suppose that people can accumulate up tó k 1 1 units of
indivisible money, where k is finite. Hence there are k f 1 production statea
pj and a similar number of trading states cj, where j stands for the number
of units of money kept in inventory and runa from 0 to k. The value function
for type Y is given by the matrix (Vr~(Y),V~~(Y))~-ó. The set of market
types for this economy ia defined as before: . .
MTk - {Y : ~(u - e;(Y)) C rV~(Y)}.24
A market type agent is willing to accumulate up to j~ 1 units of money if:
Vvi-Vdi-r)-e~0.
The Bellman's equations fot the production states pj in continuous time
are as followa:
rVy~(Y) - a max{u - e;(Y), V~~(Y) - Vri(Y) - e~}.
As for trading states cj:
rV~o(Y) - QM-'rnax{tl, u~ -~ Voo(Y) - V~o(Y)} t
(i(1 - wo)(M - 1)M-' max{O, Vn~ (Y) - V~(Y) - e},
rV~~(Y) - QM-~ max{0, u~ t Vo~(Y) - V~~(Y)} t
Q(1 - wo)(M - 1)M-2 max{O, Vyl;t,)(Y) - V~~(Y) - e} ~{-
i-k-1
,0( ~ w;tJ;tr)(M - 1)M-~ max{O,u~ ~ V~l;-,)(Y) - V~~(Y)},
~-o
rY~k(Y) - QM-' max{0, u~ .} VPk(Y) - V~k(Y)} f
i-k-1
Q( ~ w.e;ti)(N1 - 1)M-~max{0,u~ t V~(k-r)(Y) -V~k(Y)},
;-o
where agents with index j- 1, 2, ... , k- 1 can engage in barter, sales, and
purchases. Type c0 only barters or sells, and type ck barters or buys. The
fraction of traders holding i units of money is denoted by "w;". The greek
letters "B;}rT stand for the trader's belief about the probability that a holder
of i units of money accepts another unit in exchange. For beliefs to be
consistent in monetary equilibrium we require that 17;t~ - 1 for i G k- 1.
Now wc can statc fonnally that this gencralization implics diminishing
marginal utility of holding money:
Propoaition 8!n a monetary equiliórium where agents accumulate up to k
units of money: OV~~~ ~ OV~~ for j' G j.25
An implication is that the gains from accepting money in exchange for
goods, Vvi - V~~i-~~ - c, is non-increaeing in j:
Proposition 9 Ijj' c j C k, then
Vvi - Vdi-1) C Vvi' - V~i~-r~.
These two properties suggeste a rationale for reduced form modela such
as money in utility function.
7 Lemmae and proofs
7.1 Trading arrangements: The barter case
The following lemma says that market traders have an strictly positive ex-
pected discounted utility from trading, provided that thefractionofsearchers,
N„ is also positive:
Lemma l Ij N, ~ 0, then u~ f Vv - V~ 0 jor all Y E MTs.
Proof. Otherwise, V- 0 and hence Y~ MT6. QED.
7.2 The welfare cost of barter: A gift-giving arrange-
ment
Proposition 1 The gift-giving arrangement is ez ante Pareto superior to
barter, and the weljare costs oj óarter can 6e measured 6y
1- ~toM
~faM~~
Proof. A direct comparison between the average8ow utility under barter
r~N.Vi f~1 - N,)Vv) -~} aM~~u~ - ei),26
and under gift-giving
r(NsVT i. (1 - Ns)Vp) - ~ }~M(u~ - ei)
establishes the result. Subtracting from one the ratio of the former to the
latter yields the desired measure of the welfare coat of barter. QED.
Proposition 2 The gift-giving arrangement is atatewise Pareto superiorto
óarter:
VT ~ V(Y) and Vp ~ Vp(Y) for a!I Y E OT,
and equality for the remaining types.
Proof. The result boils down to the relation:
Q(u~ - áei) - (rM~ t Q(1 - á))V(Y)
- (rM ~ Q(I - á))VT(Y),
where a' - o~(a ~ r). QED.
Proposition 3 The degree of specialization under the gift-giving arrange-
ment is higher than under óarter.
Proof. R.ecall that a market type Y under barter ia characterized by the
inequality:
u- e~(Y) C V(Y) - YD(Y) - e~.
In a similar fashion, we have outward types Y in the gift-giving arrangement:
u- e;(Y) C VT(Y) - Vp(Y) - e~.
The claim follows if we show that
VT-Vp1V~-Vp.27
By direct computation we have
V,-Vp
~u~ -~ aM~e;
~ f (r t ~)M~'
~u. f aMe;
~ f (r f ~)M. VT-Vp
It can be seen that the latter LHS is greater than the former one, for u~ ~
e; 1 0 and M~ ~ M imply a reweigh towarda the largeat number. QED.
7.3 Trading arrangements: The fiat money case
The proposition which followa establishes that a producer holding money is
never worse off than one without it:
Lemma 2 For alt market types Y: Va G Vym.
Proof. Suppose that
V~ ~ Va,,,.
Bellman equations for the production statea imply:
o(V~,,,-Vvm -ei) Ga(V~- Va-e;).
It follows that V~ - V~ G VP,,, - V~,,, V~„ G V~, Va G V~ and VD,,, - V~ - e G 0.
Turning to the trading states:
rV~ - ~M-~(u~ ~ Va - V ),
rV~.,,, ? ,OM'~(u~ f Vp,,, - V~,,,).
Clearly, Vp,,, - V~,,, 1 Y~ - V~ impliea V~,,, ~ V~, which contradicta thc
inequality obtained before. QED.
The following corollary says that a searcher holding money is never worse
off than one who does not:28
Corollary 1 For all market typea Y: V~ G V~„ and
V,~ - V~ ~ Vo,,, - V~,,,.
The following is the formal statement that the reason to accept money in
exchange is the expectation that it will be spent later on:
Lemma 3 For all market typesY in a monetary equilibrium: u~~V~- V~m ~
0.
Proof. By Corollary 1, V~,,, 1 V~ and Vp~ - V~ ~ Vp,,, - Vc,,,. Then
max{0, u~ f V~ - V~} ~ max{0, u~ ~- Vy,,, - Vc,,, }.
If u~fV~-V~„ G 0, Bellman's equations for the trading states imply V~ 1 V~,,,.
Contradiction. QED.
Now we will show that market typea barter whenever they can:
Lemma 4 !n a monetary equilibrium for all market types we must have:
u~tV,~-V~~O,
u~ f Va,,, - V~,,, ~ 0.
Proof. Lemma 3, by summing inequalities, implies
u~fYP,,,-V~,,,-e~0.
Hence the second inequality holds. The first one follows from the implication
of Lemma 2: V~ - V~ ? Vp,n - V~,,. QED.
The claim which follows asserts that monetary exchange is at most an
approximation to the first best " gift-giving" arrangement:29
Proposition 4 f,et f~ with j- pc, pm, c, cm be the fraction oJ market types
in state j. The maximum of the active trader's ez-ante payoff
~~(f~~a f J~.V~. t I~V~ f fn„Vm,)
és achieved at w~ - 0.5. However, that value is strictly less than the "gift-
giving" payojj
a~
~ -F oM (u~ - ei)-
Proof. To aimplify computations a bit, let us set the lump sum cost of
accepting money e- 0, while keeping it strictly positive for all commodities.
Then the ex-ante payoff of monetary exchange boils down to
a~(w~ t( 1 - w~)(1 f w~(M - 1)))
i~(w~ -~ (1 - w~)(1 f w~(M - 1))) f aM~ (u~ - ei)-
Taking FOC, we find the optimal value w~ - 0.5. Hence the ~optimum quan-
tity of money" is m(0.5). Replacing this value in tlie preceding formula, it is
easy to check that the ex-ante utility of monetary exchange never overtakea
the gift-giving artangement. QED.
The following establishes the Pareto superiority of monetary exchange:
Proposition 5 Monetary exchange is ez-ante Paretosuperiorl0 óarter. The
market type's average utility is óounded below by
a(3(u~ - e~)
~ ~ aM~ .
Proof. In a monetary equilibtium for all market types Vp,,, - V~ - e G 0.
Furthermore,
V~ G V~ G Vp,,, G V~,,,.
By Lemma 4 we get
rV -,BM-~(u~ f Vo~ - V~) f
~i(1 - w~)(M - 1)M-~(VD,,, - V~ - e).30
After some operations:
r (f~V~ -F fxVno1 , oQ(u~ - ei)
` f~ ~- Íx J af~M~ .
It followa immediately that jaVa .} f~Ve t fD,,,Vy,,, f f~,,,V~„
the same lower bound. QED.
has, a fortiori,
Lemma S For all market typea: Ya 1 Yo.
Proof. In Appendix B it was shown that N, - j~~(j-E ja). 1'hen
Proposition 5 can be rewritten as follows:
N,V~ ~(1 - N,)V~ 1 N,V, f(1 - N,)Vy.
On the other hand, recalling Bellman's equations for production states
,~ (r t a)Yp - a(V - ei),
(r ~ a)Vtt - o(Y~ - ei),
we can eliminate V~ and V in the above inequality, and conclusion will come
out. QED.
Proposition 6 Monetary exchange is statewise Pareto superior to barter:
V G min{V~, V~,,,} and Vy G min{Up~, Yym}.
Proof. This is an almost immediate corollary from the previous Propo-
sition and the last I,emma.
Proposition ? Let Y6 G 1 6e the marginal type under barler. Ij lhe e,(jort
function e;(Y) is continuous in a neighborhood of Yb, then monetary exchange
will incnease the economy-wide specialization.
5.
Proof. It is a consequence of the monotonicity of e;(Y) and Proposition31
7.4 A generalized monetary model
In this model, for all market typea Y, the marginal utility of holding money
is non-incma.ving in the Ievel of inventory j:
Proposition 8 For all market typea and finite k~ 1. Forj' C j: ~V~~~ ~
OV~~.
Proof. By hypothesis, agents accumulate up to k units of money. Let us
subtract the Bellman equation for V~k-~I from the equation for V~k. After a
few manipulations we get:
p A-~k- ` 1
F~( L whehtt)(M - I)OVc(k-9) -
h-0
R(I - tUp)(M - 1)(Vyk - V~k-~) - E) ~
h-k-1
(rM' .f- fir~(r f a) i. A( ~ wABAti)(M - 1))OV~Ik-11.
h-0
Notice that, in a monetary economy, 1- wo ~ 0 and BAt~ - 1 for h C k- 1,
implying that V~k - V~~k-11 - E~ 0. Therefore,
h-k-1
LHS 1(rM~ f Qr~(r f o) f~( ~ whBAfi)(M - 1))OVik-lI.
h-0
On th~, uth~,r hand, Lh~ ~-nt,(6cicnt of OV~k-i~ is strictly qreator than that
of OV~~k-~~. Further, we know that ~V~~ ~ 0 for j C k. Hence, we must have
~V~~k-ZI ~ ~V~~k-~I.
Now subtract the equation for V~lk-~l from the one for V~k-lI. After
similar manipulations, we obtain:
A-k-1
(rM~ ~- Qr~(rf ct) -1- A(1 - wo f~ wA9hti)(M - 1))~V~lk-zI -
h-o
h-k-1
~(I - wo)(M - 1)(a~(r f a))~V~k-11 f i( ~ wAehti)(M - 1)
h-0
~ i~~~k-3~.32
It ia easy to see that, if OV~(k-3) c ~V~(k-~), then the LHS of the equation
would exceed the RHS by at least
(rM~ } Yr,~r } ~))OVc(k-4),
since we know that
OVc(k-y) i Ov~k-~).
Consequently, OVc(k-3) ? OV~(k-z). A finite repetition of this backwards
induction proves the proposition. QED.
Proposition 9 For all market types and j' G j G k, then
Vvi - V~(i-i) C Vvi' - Vc(i'-i)~
Proof. From the Bellman equation for production states we conclude
that
OVvi - ~a~~r -h a~)OV~i.
Suppoae that the proposition is falae and j' - j - 1, then
OV~(i-i) ~ ~Vv(i-i) ~ OV~(i-2)~
which implies increasing marginal utility of money. Contradiction. QED.33
Appendix
A Expected discounted utilities under barter
For market types Y, straightforward computations yield
rQu~ - (rMz t Q)eil
rVp - a 1` J
Q f (r -~ a)Mz
rV - Q r(r -I- a)u~ - ae'
I `Q t (r f a)Mz
r((1 - Ni)Va t NiV)- Q}áMz (u~ - e~)
V - Vy - iju~ ~- aMzc,
Q f (r f a)Mz
B Distribution of trading population over
states
Let us denote by fj with j- pc, pm, c, and cm the fraction of market type
people in state j at a point in time. They satisfy the following system of
equations determining their law of motion:
Íx - pM-zf~ - afx
fn.n - Q(1 - w~)(M - 1)M-z f~ ~- (iM-z f~,,, - afv,n
f~ - Qw~(M - 1)M-z f~ t afv~ -
QM~z(1 ~ (1 - wc)(M - 1))fc~
For the steady state proportiona we set f~ - 0. We are not interested in
the detail of the solution; however, we point out that the system implies:REFERENCES 34
QÍ~ - ~M~fx,
(1 - w~)f~ - wol~.
Interesting enough, the steady atate proportion between c and pc is the
same as that in barter between p and t. Hence
j~ ~M'
N~-Í~tÍa-at~M~.
Regarding the second equation, w~ is an exogenous variable which reflects
the real cash balances per capita. The only restriction we impose on is that
OCw~Gl.
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